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Abstract
Bit commitment involves the submission of evidence from one party to another so
that the evidence can be used to confirm a later revealed bit value by the first party,
while the second party cannot determine the bit value from the evidence alone. It
is widely believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible
due to quantum entanglement cheating, which is codified in a general impossibility
theorem. In this paper, the scope of this general impossibility proof is extended and
analyzed, and gaps are found. Three specific protocols are described for which the
entanglement cheating as given in the impossibility proof fails to work. One of these
protocols, QBC2, is proved to be unconditionally secure.
PACS #: 03.67Dd, 03.65Bz
NOTE
(1) In this v7 of the paper, which is really version 3, the two previous versions are
subsumed and complete proofs are given for all the claims. The “history” of some of the
protocols discussed can be traced from the previous v1-v6 of this paper.
(2) Many of the points made in this version were mentioned in my Capri talk in July
2000. However, the paper prepared for that Proceedings volume, which is available at quant-
ph/0009113, concentrates on anonymous-key cryptography with only passing remarks on bit
commitment.
(3) The reader interested only in an unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment
protocol can go directly form section II to section VI.
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I Introduction
Quantum cryptography [1], the study of information security systems involving quantum
effects, has recently been associated almost exclusively with the cryptographic objective of
key distribution. This is due primarily to the nearly universal acceptance of the general
impossibility of secure quantum bit commitment (QBC), taken to be a consequence of the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type entanglement cheating which rules out QBC and other
quantum protocols that have been proposed for various other cryptographic objectives [2].
In a bit commitment scheme, one party, Adam, provides another party, Babe, with a piece
of evidence that he has chosen a bit b (0 or 1) which is committed to her. Later, Adam
would “open” the commitment: revealing the bit b to Babe and convincing her that it is
indeed the committed bit with the evidence in her possession. The usual concrete example
is for Adam to write down the bit on a piece of paper which is then locked in a safe to be
given to Babe, while keeping for himself the safe key that can be presented later to open the
commitment. The evidence should be binding, i.e., Adam should not be able to change it,
and hence the bit, after it is given to Babe. It should also be concealing, i.e., Babe should
not be able to tell from it what the bit b is. Otherwise, either Adam or Babe would be able
to cheat successfully.
In standard cryptography, secure bit commitment is to be achieved either through a
trusted third party or by invoking an unproved assumption on the complexity of certain
computational problem. By utilizing quantum effects, various QBC schemes not involving a
third party have been proposed that were supposed to be unconditionally secure, in the sense
that neither Adam nor Babe can cheat with any significant probability of success as a matter
of physical laws. In 1995-1996, a general proof on the impossibility of unconditionally secure
QBC and the insecurity of previously proposed protocols were described [3]-[6]. Henceforth,
it has been accepted that secure QBC and related objectives are impossible as a matter of
principle [7]-[8].
There is basically just one impossibility proof, which gives the EPR attacks for the cases of
equal and unequal density operators that Babe has for the two different bit values. The proof
shows that if Babe’s successful cheating probability PBc is close to the value 1/2, which is
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obtainable from pure guessing of the bit value, then Adam’s successful cheating probability
PAc is close to the perfect value 1. This result is stronger than the mere impossibility of
unconditional security, namely that it is impossible to have both PBc ∼ 1/2 and PAc ∼ 0.
Since there is no known characterization of all possible QBC protocols, logically there can
really be no general impossibility proof, strong or not, even if it were indeed impossible to
have an unconditionally secure QBC protocol. This problem of scope of the impossibility
proof can be seen from the following simple example.
Suppose Adam commits a state |φ〉 of a single qubit (two-dimensional quantum state
space) for the bit value 0 and |φ′〉 for 1. Adam opens by declaring the bit value, and Babe
verifies by measuring the corresponding projection, |φ〉〈φ| or |φ′〉〈φ′|. It is intuitively clear,
but will be formalized as local state invariance in this paper, that Adam can launch no
effective EPR cheat. Of course, it is true in this case that if PBc ∼ 1/2 then |〈φ|φ′〉|2 ∼ 1,
so PAc ∼ 1 simply by declaring the bit value 1 even when |φ〉 is committed. However, it is a
priori possible for a protocol to have the property that PBc ∼ 1/2 while Adam cannot form
any effective cheating entanglement as in this example but with PAc ∼ 0. To have a general
impossibility proof, one has to show that this property cannot be obtained in any QBC
protocol or that any unconditionally secure QBC protocol would contradict some known
principle. The mere absence of counterexamples does not constitute a proof.
The general questions of scope of the impossibility proof will be addressed specifically
in Section IV. Three QBC schemes not covered by the impossibility proof will be described
in Sections V-VII, although only one of them, QBC2 in Section VI, is proved to be uncon-
ditionally secure in this papper. The results are developed within nonrelativistic quantum
mechanics, unrelated to relativistic protocols [9] or cheat-sensitive protocols [10]. The essen-
tial point is that the flow of classical information between Adam and Babe in the protocol is
crucial to the possible operations they can carry out, hence fundamentally affecting the se-
curity level of the scheme. In the impossibility proof, it is basically assumed that both Adam
and Babe possess full information at each stage of the protocol, an unwarranted assumption.
In Section II the impossibility proof will be reviewed. Since the issues involved in quan-
tum cryptography, or classical cryptography for that matter, are often subtle, it is the policy
of this paper to give complete proofs for its claims. Thus, the gap between the quantitative
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impossibility claim and the result available in the literature will be filled. An in-principle
insecure protocol QBC0 is also described that underlies QBC1 and QBC3. In Section III,
the impossibility proof in the original formulation is extended to cover the situation in
which Babe applies a superoperator transformation to Adam’s committed state before per-
fect verification. Another insecure protocol QBC01, related to QBC0, is described as an
illustration. The reader who just wants to see an unconditionally secure QBC protocol can
go directly from Section II to Section VI. Note that the results in this paper are valid in
infinite-dimensional spaces. Also, the same index symbols i, j, etc., may denote different
quantities in different sections.
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II The Impossibility Proof
In this Section we review the standard formulation of the impossibility proof and then recast
it in a form more suitable for quantitative analysis and extension, and describe a protocol
QBC0. The development of this section will be used in the rest of the paper.
According to the impossibility proof, Adam would generate |Φ0〉 or |Φ1〉 depending on b
= 0 or 1,
|Φ0〉 =
∑
i
√
pi|ei〉|φi〉, (1)
|Φ1〉 =
∑
i
√
p′i|e′i〉|φ′i〉 (2)
where the states {|φi〉} and {|φ′i〉} in HB are openly known, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, {pi} and {p′i}
are known probabilities, while {|ei〉} and {|e′i〉} are two complete orthonormal sets in HA.
All Dirac kets are normalized in this paper. Adam sends Babe HB while keeping HA to
himself. He opens by measuring the basis {|ei〉} or {|e′i〉} in HA according to his committed
state |Φ0〉 or |Φ1〉, resulting in a specific |φi〉 or |φ′i〉 on HB, and telling Babe which i he
has obtained. Babe verifies by measuring the corresponding projector and will obtain the
value 1 (yes) with probability 1. Adam can, as was argued, switch between |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉 by
operation on HA alone, and thus alter the evidence to suit his choice of b before opening the
commitment. In the case ρB0 ≡ trA|Φ0〉〈Φ0| = ρB1 ≡ trA|Φ1〉〈Φ1|, the switching operation is
to be obtained by using the so-called “Schmidt decomposition [11],” the expansion of |Φ0〉
and |Φ1〉 in terms of the eigenstates |φˆk〉 of ρB0 = ρB1 with eigenvalues λk and the eigenstates
|eˆk〉 and |eˆ′k〉 of ρA0 and ρA1 ,
|Φ0〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|eˆk〉|φˆk〉, |Φ1〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|eˆ′k〉|φˆk〉 (3)
By applying a unitary UA that brings {|eˆk〉} to {|eˆ′k〉}, Adam can select between |Φ0〉 or |Φ1〉
any time before he opens the commitment but after he supposedly commits. When ρB0 and
ρB1 are not equal but close, it was shown that one may transform |Φ0〉 by an UA to a |Φ˜0〉
with |〈Φ1|Φ˜0〉| as close to 1 as ρB0 is close to ρB1 according to the fidelity F chosen, and thus
the state |Φ˜0〉 would serve as the effective EPR cheat.
In addition to the above quantitative relations, the gist of the impossibility proof is
supposed to lie in its generality – that any QBC protocol could be fitted into its formulation,
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as a consequence of various arguments advanced in [3]-[8]. Among other reasons to be
elaborated in Section IV, it appeared to the present author from his development of a new
cryptographic tool, anonymous quantum key technique [12], that the impossibility proof is
not sufficiently general. First of all, there is no need for Adam to entangle anything in an
honest protocol. When Adam picks b=0, he can just send Babe a state |φi〉 with probability
pi. When he picks b=1, he sends |φ′i〉 with probability p′i. If the anonymous key technique
is employed, |φi〉 and |φ′i〉 are to be obtained from applying Ui or U ′i from some fixed openly
known set of unitary operators {Ui} and {U ′i} on HB by Adam to the states |ψ〉 sent to him
by Babe and known only to her. As a consequence, Adam would not be able to determine
the cheating unitary transformation UA as in protocol QBC1, to be described in Section V
after the impossibility proof is first analyzed generally.
In a QBC protocol, the {|φi〉} and {|φ′i〉} are chosen so that they are concealing as evi-
dence, i.e. Babe cannot reliably distinguish them in optimum binary hypothesis testing [13].
(The role of quantum detection theory in QBC together with some new results used in this
paper are elaborated in Appendix A). They would also be binding if Adam is honest and
sends them as they are above, which he could not change after Babe receives them. Babe
can always guess the bit with a probability of success PBc = 1/2, while Adam should not
be able to change a committed bit at all. However, it is meaningful and common to grant
unconditional security when the best P¯Bc Babe can achieve is arbitrarily close to 1/2 and
Adam’s best probability of successfully changing a committed bit P¯Ac is arbitrarily close to
zero even when both parties have perfect technology and unlimited resources including un-
limited computational power [4]. To facilitate the quantitative analysis of these performance
measures, the impossibility proof would first be reformulated.
Before proceeding, note the following basic property of entanglement important in QBC.
Theorem (Local State Invariance): Let ρAB be a state onHA⊗HB with marginal states ρA ≡
trBρ
AB, ρB. The individual or combined effects of any state transformation and quantum
measurement (averaged over the measurement results) on HA alone leaves ρB invariant.
See Appendix B for a proof and a discussion of its role in the impossibility of superluminal
communication via quantum entanglement.
As a consequence of this theorem, Adam cannot cheat by changing the ρB0 6= ρB1 case to
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the ρB0 = ρ
B
1 case whatever the ρ’s are. In particular, a single pure state as in the example
of Section I cannot be changed.
The operation of unitary transformation with subsequent measurement of an orthonormal
basis is equivalent to the mere measurement of another orthonormal basis {|e˜i〉} on the
system. Thus, the net cheating operation can be described by writing
|Φ0〉 =
∑
i
√
p˜i|e˜i〉|φ˜i〉, (4)
√
p˜i|φ˜i〉 ≡
∑
j
√
pjVji|φj〉 (5)
for a unitary matrix V defined by |ei〉 = ∑j Vij |e˜j〉, and then measuring |e˜i〉. For convenience,
we may still in the rest of the paper refer to the cheating operation as a UA transformation
described at the beginning of this Section. Local state invariance is a property complemen-
tary to the fact that the |φ˜i〉 obtainable by operation on HA alone are some proper linear
combinations of the |φi〉 from (5). The quantitative expression for PAc can now be given. If
Babe verifies the individual |φ′i〉, the Adam’s successful cheating probability is
PAc =
∑
i
p˜i|〈φ˜i|φ′i〉|2. (6)
In general, the optimal cheating probability P¯Bc for Babe is given by the probability of
correct decision for optimally discriminating between two density operators ρB0 and ρ
B
1 by
any quantum measurement. From (A4) with p0 = 1/2,
P¯Bc =
1
4
(2 + ‖ρB0 − ρB1 ‖1) (7)
where ‖ · ‖1 is the trace norm, ‖τ‖1 ≡ tr(τ †τ)1/2, for a trace-class operator τ [14]. In terms
of a security parameter n that can be made arbitrarily large ,the statement of unconditional
security (US) can be quantitatively expressed as
(US) lim
n
P¯Bc =
1
2
and lim
n
P¯Ac = 0. (8)
Condition (US) is equivalent to the statement that for any ǫ > 0, there exists an n0 such
that for all n > n0, P¯
B
c − 12 < ǫ and P¯Ac < ǫ, i.e. P¯Bc − 12 and P¯Ac can both be made
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arbitrarily small for sufficiently large n. The impossibility proof claims a lot more than the
mere impossibility of (US), it asserts [4] the following statement (IP):
(IP) lim
n
P¯Bc =
1
2
⇒ lim
n
P¯Ac = 1. (9)
In the ρB0 = ρ
B
1 case, the EPR cheat shows that P¯
B
c =
1
2
implies P¯Ac = 1. Thus (IP)
generalizes it to the assertion that the function P¯Ac (P¯
B
c ), obtained by varying n, is continuous
from above at P¯Bc =
1
2
. Note the considerable difference between the truth of (IP) and the
much weaker statement that (US) is impossible. In the middle ground that limn P¯
B
c =
1
2
implies just 0 < limn P¯
A
c < 1, the protocol would be concealing for Babe and cheat-sensitive
for Adam.
The key observation [3]-[4] in the proof of (IP) is the use of Uhlmann’s theorem, that
there exist purifications |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉 of any given ρ0 and ρ1 such that |〈Φ0|Φ1〉|2 attains the
maximum possible value given by F (ρ0, ρ1) ≡
∣∣∣tr√√ρ0ρ1√ρ0∣∣∣2. The conclusion is drawn,
without supporting details, that if F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) is close to 1, then so is P¯
A
c . This conclusion
can be related to (IP) via the bound [15]
2[1−
√
F (ρ0, ρ1)] ≤ ‖ρ0 − ρ1‖1. (10)
as follows. Let ‖ρB0 − ρB1 ‖1 ≤ ǫ, so that F (ρB0 , ρB1 ) ≥ (1 − ǫ2)2 from (10). From Uhlmann’s
theorem, choose |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉 of (1)-(2) to be the purifications that achieve the maximum
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) so that |〈Φ0|Φ1〉| ≥ 1 − ǫ2 . The cheating operation on |Φ0〉 is given by (5), and
Adam’s successful cheating probability is given by the following
Lemma 1: For probabilities αi and complex numbers λi,
∑
i
αi|λi|2 ≥
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
αiλi
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(11)
(the sums can be over infinite sets).
Proof: When λi are real, (11) follows from Jensen’s inequality [16] and the concavity of the
function x 7→ x2. The complex case follows by expanding each λi into real and imaginary
parts. ✷
Since 〈Φ˜0|Φ1〉 = ∑i√p′ip˜i〈φ˜i|φ′i〉, it follows from (11) with λi =
√
p˜i/p′i〈φ˜i|φ′i〉 (no need to
include the p′i = 0 terms) and αi = p
′
i that P¯
A
c ≥ 1 − ǫ whenever P¯Bc ≤ 12 + ǫ4 . Thus, the
statement (IP) is proved. In particular, one has the convergence rate
P¯Bc =
1
2
+O
(
1
n
)
⇒ P¯Ac = 1− O
(
1
n
)
. (12)
As an illustration, consider the following protocol, in which hashing via the parity func-
tion is used to make ρB0 close to ρ
B
1 in a sequence generalization of the example in Section I.
PROTOCOL QBC0:
(i) Adam sends Babe a sequence of n qubits, each is either one of {|φ〉, |φ′〉}, such that
an even number of |φ′〉 corresponds to b = 0 and an odd number to b = 1, with probability
1/2n−1 for each sequence of either parity.
(ii) Adam opens the commitment by revealing the sequence of n states. Babe verifies
by measuring the corresponding projection on each qubit to see that the entire sequence is
correct.
To show that this scheme can be made concealing, note that ρB0 − ρB1 factorizes into
products of individual qubit parts as follows. Let j = (j1, . . . , jn) ∈ {0, 1}n, Pl0 = |φ〉〈φ|,
Pl1 = |φ′〉〈φ′|, l ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let Λ0 = {j|⊕nl=1 jl = 0}, Λ1 = {j|⊕nl=1 jl = 1} be the even
and odd parity n-bit sets. Then
ρBi =
1
2n−1
∑
j∈Λi
n⊗
l=1
Pljl, i ∈ {0, 1} (13)
and so
ρB0 − ρB1 =
1
2n−1
n⊗
l=1
(Pl0 − Pl1). (14)
Thus, Babe’s optimum quantum decision reduces to optimally deciding between |φ〉 and |φ′〉
for each qubit individually and then seeing whether there is an even or odd number of |φ′〉’s.
The optimum error probability pe for each qubit is given in (A5), and the optimum error
probability P¯Bc of correct bit decision on the sequence is, from the even and odd binomial
sums (cf. Appendix C),
P¯Bc =
1
2
+
1
2
(1− 2pe)n. (15)
Thus, P¯Bc is close to
1
2
exponentially in n independently of 1
2
≥ pe > 0. However, Adam
can now cheat by forming entanglement as in (1)-(2), with P¯Ac exponentially close to 1 in
accordance with (IP).
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III An Extension of the Impossibility Proof
In this Section, a protocol QBC01 will be described in which Babe introduces a lossy trans-
formation on Adam’s committed state while still being able to verify perfectly. While it
may be argued that such transformation cannot succeed in obtaining a secure protocol on
qualitative grounds, it may also be argued otherwise. Specifically, the coherence of the states
(1)-(2) can be deliberately destroyed by Babe with such a CP map, reducing the entangled
states to incoherent superpositions in her observation space. It turns out that if she does
that, which she can emphatically do, the resulting condition on the number n of modes would
not fit with the other requirements of the protocol. Indeed, the impossibility proof will be
extended to cover all such possibilities of Babe introducing a CP-map transformation.
The following protocol is closely related to QBC0.
PROTOCOL QBC01.
(i) Adam sends Babe a sequence of n states |αl〉 ∈ HBl , HB =
⊗
lHBl , each |αl〉 being
either one of two coherent states {|α〉, |α′〉}, such that an even number of |α′〉 corresponds
to b = 0 and an odd number to b = 1, with probability 1/2n−1 for each sequence of either
parity.
(ii) Babe splits each state |αl〉 to |√ηαl〉 on HBl , η < 1.
(iii) Adam opens the commitment by revealing the sequence of n states. Babe verifies
by measuring the corresponding projection on each |√ηαl〉 to see that the entire sequence is
correct.
The cheating transformation on this protocol would produce from (5) a superposition of
coherent states with large energy difference when |α−α′| >> 1. As explained in version 2 of
this paper (v4-v6), such superpositions are supersensitive to loss [17]-[19], thus offering the
possibility that a lossy transformation, which would not afect perfect verification on coherent
states, would destroy the necessary entanglement for Adam to cheat successfully. However,
in this multimode situation, in order to destroy the coherence one needs to have a loss of one
photon per mode, not just one photon, and the protocol cannot be made secure. Indeed, this
condition on the destruction of coherence is what makes fault-tolerant quantum computing
in the presence of loss possible.
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We now give the impossibility proof that defeats such a maneuver by Babe. Let JB be
any completely positve (CP) map (superoperator) on density operators introduced by Babe.
Let XBi1 be the measurement operator that perfectly verifies the b = 1 case given i, i.e. X
B
i1
is the Π1 operator part of a POM for the “1” or “not 1” decision in quantum hypothesis
testing as described in Appendix A, with perfect verification corresponding to the condition
trXBi1JB|φ′i〉〈φ′i| = 1. (16)
The PAc then becomes
PAc =
∑
i
p˜itrX
B
i1JB|φ˜i〉〈φ˜i|. (17)
The following lemma and all other results in this paper are valid in infinite-dimensional
spaces.
Lemma 2 [14]: For any bounded operator X and any trace-class operator τ ,
|trXτ | ≤ ‖X‖‖τ‖1, (18)
where ‖ · ‖ is the ordinary operator norm.
Since ‖XBi1‖ ≤ 1, from (18) we get
PAc ≥ 1−
∑
i
p˜i
∥∥∥JB(|φ˜i〉〈φ˜i| − |φ′i〉〈φ′i|)
∥∥∥
1
. (19)
From the original PAc =
∑
i p˜i|〈φ˜i|φ′i〉|2 ≥ 1 − ǫ for ‖ρB0 − ρB1 ‖ ≤ ǫ proved in Section II, one
obtains, by relating inner product and trace norm for pure states as in (A4)-(A5),
∑
i
p˜i
∥∥∥|φ˜i〉〈φ˜i| − |φ′i〉〈φ′i|∥∥∥2
1
≤ 4ǫ. (20)
The following theorem is actually valid for any positive trace-preserving map J .
Theorem [20]:
‖J (ρ0 − ρ1)‖1 ≤ ‖ρ0 − ρ1‖1. (21)
From (20) and (21),
∑
i p˜i
∥∥∥JB (|φ˜i〉〈φ˜i| − |φ′i〉〈φ′i|)
∥∥∥2
1
≤ 4ǫ and, using (11),
∑
i
p˜i
∥∥∥JB (φ˜i〉〈φ˜i| − |φ′i〉〈φ′i|)∥∥∥
1
≤ 2√ǫ. (22)
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Putting (22) into (19) yields PAc ≥ 1 − 2
√
ǫ, completing the proof of (IP). It appears that
the use of the trace norm cannot be avoided here, in contrast to the JB = IB case, which is
responsible for the weakening of the P¯Ac convergence rate from 1− O
(
1
n
)
to 1− O
(
1√
n
)
.
The perfect verification condition (16), preserved in protocol QBC01, is not necessary for
a secure QBC protocol. This point and the entanglement destruction strategy of protocol
QBC01 will be exploited in protocol QBC3 of Section VII. These possibilities also suggest
that it is now appropriate to examine the assumptions underlying the impossibility proof.
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IV The Limited Scope of the Impossibility Proof
The generality of the scope of the impossibility proof is analyzed in this section on general
grounds. This is an important issue because unconditionally secure bit commitment is too
useful to give up easily, and the available impossibility proof has many weaknesses that
can be exploited for secure QBC protocols. At the very least, one may hope that hidden
assumptions, perhaps practically valid, may be revealed. Indeed one such assumption is that
the quantum and classical communications involved are over a perfect channel, which should
be considered different from the assumption that the parties have perfect technology. This
is a good assumption for some situations, but not others such as long-distance fiber-optic
communications. Another example in which this assumption is not valid involves satellite-
to-satellite optical communications where the receivers’ fields of view have to be opened up,
perhaps because the signals are deliberately spread, so that the sun’s background contributes
a significant amount of noise. In both of these cases, one can stretch the meaning of “perfect
technology” to say that no unavoidable classical disturbance needs to be present – say, by
throwing the sun to another galaxy. (And what about the cosmic background radiation?)
But then the relevance of such results to reality is quite questionable. In this paper, a perfect
channel is granted. Since it is widely believed that there is a complete impossibility proof in
such a case, I would try to show otherwise independently of the protocols of the paper.
The major problem is, of course, to decide whether the formulation given in [3]-[8] is
sufficiently broad to include all possible QBC protocols. Typically, one proves general im-
possibility by showing that any concretely suggested possibility would lead to a contradiction.
The simplest example is that the possibility of superluminal communication via quantum
entanglement would contradict local state invariance (cf. Appendix B). Another example
would be the quantum no-clone theorem, where cloning contradicts unitarity on a sufficiently
large Hilbert space [21] as well as quantum detection theory (cf. Appendix A). In von Neu-
mann’s famous no-hidden-variable theorem [22], a contradiction is derived from what he
considered to be the requirements for a hidden-variable theory. Perhaps more significant
and illuminating is the impossibility proof of certain geometric constructions by straight-
edge and compass developed in the first half of the nineteenth century, in which any such
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construction is characterized by the membership of a certain number lying in a tower of
quadratic extension fields [23]. This example is significant because it is nontrivial to capture
enough of the essence of any straightedge-and-compass construction to be able to produce
a mathematical contradiction when the construction is impossible. Thus, for a general im-
possibility proof of unconditionally secure QBC, one would expect that the general essence
of any such protocol would be extracted to yield a contradiction. Clearly the impossibility
proof does not do that, but rather relies on the claim that any possible QBC protocol can be
reduced to its formulation. It is not a priori impossible to exhaustively describe and classify
all operations of a certain kind, say, in quantum key distribution one typically character-
izes all possible attacks Eve can launch. However, it is much more difficult to characterize
all possible protocols than all possible attacks for any cryptographic objective because an
arbitrary interactive flow of information between users is possible in a protocol. Indeed,
no characterization of all protocols for a specific objective is known in standard (classical)
cryptography. The scope problems of the impossibility proof are numbered as follows.
(1) One justification for the all-encompassing nature of the formulation is that Adam is
proceeding exactly as if he were honest, except right before opening, in carrying out his EPR
cheat. This is not true because there is no need for him to entangle anything in an honest
protocol. He can just pick a |φi〉 or |φ′i〉 and send it.
(2) Because of this, it is not clear why Adam must be able to form the entanglement he
needs for any possible protocol.
(3) Furthermore, it is not clear why Adam must be able to determine the cheating
transformation, even apart from complexity questions, for any possible protocol. Protocol
QBC1 of section V provides a direct challenge in this situation, while protocol QBC2 of
Section VII can also be considered to pose this problem.
(4) The formulation postpones any measurement to the end of the commitment phase
and claims that it entails no loss of generality. But why wouldn’t it affect the quantitative
cheating probabilities? Protocol QBC2 provides an example in which the timing of the
measurement has substantial consequence.
(5) The density operators ρB0 and ρ
B
1 for Babe are not necessarily the marginal states
obtained from the states generated by Adam because of Babe’s possible lack of information,
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a situation that is built into the protocol. Thus, Adam’s EPR cheat may not correspond to
the ρB0 ∼ ρB1 case. An example is provided by QBC2.
(6) It is clearly possible to avoid EPR cheats, as in the example described in Section I.
While (IP) holds in this case, it holds not because of EPR cheats. The question is: why
is it that an EPR-cheat-free protocol necessarily cannot satisfy (US)? Protocol QBC2 is an
explicit example that (US) is possible in such a protocol.
(7) It is not clear why perfect verification is necessary, the only performance measures
here being the cheating probabilities. This freedom in a QBC protocol is exploited in QBC3.
(8) It is not clear why Babe is necessarily unable to destroy Adam’s entanglement by her
action alone. Despite the failure of QBC01 of Section III, this possibility is manifested in
protocol QBC3.
The list could be continued. Note that the burden is on the impossibility proof to resolve
these points in its favor with convincing arguments, which have not been provided. Indeed,
all three protocols QBC1 to QBC3, and even protocol QBC01 to a lesser extent, lie outside
the framework of the impossibility proof, and no impossibility argument has been given for
this kind of protocols. While there are various underlying reasons on the limited scope of
the impossibility proof formulation, a major one is that the interactive flow of information
between Adam and Babe may prevent cheating because of each party’s lack of relevant
information at any particular stage of the protocol. Such information flow is what makes
the Yao model of two-party protocols [24] not sufficiently specific to characterize all QBC
protocols, which he did not claim to have done. Furthermore, modification of the Yao model
to have measurements at the end of the commitment phase, perhaps thought to be equivalent
by the Lo-Popescu theorem [25], is not justified with the use of anonymous states because
the state needs to be known to guarantee the validity of that theorem. The basic problem of
a general impossibility proof lies in the characterization of the essence of any possible QBC
protocol that makes it insecure. The information flow problem that makes it so difficult to
characterize all classical protocols surely carries over to the quantum domain.
There are well-known and widely accepted claims in the literature [26]-[27] that classical
noisy channels would make unconditionally secure bit commitment possible. While I believe
the specific protocols described in [26]-[27] are not proved unconditionally secure, I also be-
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lieve unconditionally secure ones can indeed be based on noisy channels, a subject to be
discussed elsewhere. Such results are not considered to be contradictory to the QBC impos-
sibility proof presumably for the following reasons. First, classical noise is often thought to
be part of an imperfect channel, i.e. it does not have to be present in principle. Apart from
the points made at the beginning of this section, such a viewpoint is not correct. The quan-
tum noise in any given quantum signaling scheme for classical communication, the minimum
amount of which is determined through the optimum quantum measurement via quantum
detection theory, is in principle unavoidable and functions exactly like classical noise in the
optimal quantum detector [28]-[29]. As will be shown elsewhere, this crucial point opens
up the possibility of developing unconditionally secure, practical, and efficient optical-speed
cryptographic systems for all the standard cryptographic objectives via quantum states that
are not superpositions of one another. Secondly, a truly classical noise system would not
entail the possibility of quantum entanglement and EPR cheating. However, there are many
ways to suppress EPR cheats, such as the example in Section I and the QBC2 in Section
VI. While it is not easy to restore unconditional security with such suppression in a perfect
channel, a noisy channel, even one created with quantum noise, would provide a powerful
way for such restoration. Indeed, the development of such protocols will be the subject of a
future treatment.
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V Protocol QBC1
In this Section we consider the use of anonymous states in a QBC protocol which is essentially
the one in version 1 (v1-v3) of this paper. In this protocol QBC1, the bit value is encoded
in the parity of a sequence as in QBC0 of Section II, except that each individual state is
obtained with Adam applying the openly known U0 or U1 to the states |ψ〉 sent to him by
Babe, corresponding to the 0 or 1 bit position in the sequence. For example, |ψ〉 could be any
state on a fixed great circle of the Bloch-Poincare´ sphere of a qubit, with U0 = I and U1 being
a rotation by a fixed angle on the great circle independently of the bit position, say with
〈ψ|U †1U0|ψ〉 = λ > 0. See Ref. [12] for further discussion of anonymous-key cryptography.
Coherent-state implementation is also possible, as in QBC01.
PROTOCOL QBC1:
(i) Babe sends Adam a sequence of n qubit states |ψl〉 ∈ HBl ,HB =
⊗
lHBl , l ∈ {1, . . . , n},
unknown to Adam.
(ii) Adam commits via the parity of the sequence j = (j1, . . . , jn) ∈ {0, 1}n by applying
Uljl to |ψl〉 for openly known Ul0 and Ul1, with 〈ψl|U †l1Ul0|ψl〉 = λ > 0 independently of l.
(iii) Adam opens by revealing his j sequence. Babe checks every state Uljl|ψl〉.
This scheme can be made concealing exactly as in QBC0, (14)-(15). As for its binding
behavior, consider first the situation in which Adam can only entangle each qubit individu-
ally. He cannot switch any committed Ul0|ψl〉 or Ul1|ψl〉 to any other state due to local state
invariance which applies to each of the states he sends separately for that state, expressing
the obvious fact that there is no entanglement to a single state. If he were to entangle Ul0|ψl〉
or Ul1|ψl〉 to another state anyway, he would just present a mixed state for that qubit to
Babe for that jl. In this case, a different criterion needs to be used as discussed below. If
he sticks to committing first a correct state for the bit, the best cheating probability he can
get it
PAc =
∣∣∣〈ψl|U †l1Ul0|ψl〉
∣∣∣2 = λ2 (23)
by generating any sequence of n−1 states, picking the last one for the bit commitment, and
declaring it to be otherwise when desired. From (15) and (23), one can make PAc = O(m
−1)
and P¯Bc − 1/2 = O(2−m) with n = O(m2). Hence unconditional security is obtained for
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large m if (23) is indeed the overall best Adam can do. In addition to PAc , one can use
another criterion, PAa , the average probability that Adam’s committed evidence is accepted
by Babe after he opens, which is always at least 1/2 similar to PBc with P
A
a = (1 + P
A
c )/2
when (1) is used as an initial state |Φ¯0〉 by Adam. For a general |Φ¯0〉, (6) can be simply
generalized to give an expression for PAa with optimization for P¯
A
a to be performed also over
initial {φ0i 〉}, {p0i}. In the present situation, since single-qubit entanglement by Adam would
just lead to a mixed presented state from local state invariance, P¯Aa is obtained by a fixed
|φ0i 〉 = |φ0〉 with P¯Aa = (1 + λ)/2. Thus, P¯Bc − 12 = O(2−m) and P¯Aa − 12 = O(m−1) are
achieved for n = O(m3).
Adam can, however, form the entanglement without knowing the |ψl〉’s, by applying the
unitary operator U on HA ⊗HB,
U =
∑
i
|ei〉〈ei| ⊗ Ui (24)
with initial state |A〉 ∈ HA satisfying √pi = 〈ei|A〉, as was indicated in version 1 of this
paper. On the other hand, contrary to the claim in that version, Adam can also entangle
qubit by qubit via, for each i = (i1, . . . , in) in (25),
Ui =
⊗
l
Ulil = (I1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Unin) . . . (Uii1 ⊗ . . .⊗ In). (25)
By applying (24)-(25), Adam can form the proper entangled state (1) or (2) without knowing
the |ψl〉’s. However, he cannot determine the cheating transformation UA. In general such
a cheating transformation for the ρB0 6= ρB1 case is determined by Uhlmann’s theorem as
follows [30].
Let |λi〉 and |µi〉 be the eigenstates of ρB0 and ρB1 with eigenvalues λi and µi. The Schmidt
normal forms of the purifications |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉 of ρB0 and ρB1 are given by
|Φ0〉 =
∑
i
√
λi|fi〉|λi〉, (26)
|Φ1〉 =
∑
i
√
µi|gi〉|µi〉 (27)
for complete orthonormal sets {|fi〉} and {|gi〉} on HA. Define the unitary operators U0, U1
and U2 by
U0|λi〉 = |µi〉, (28)
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U1|λi〉 = |fi〉, (29)
U2|µi〉 = |gi〉. (30)
Since one can always pick HA to be isomorphic to HB, one can identify them via the iso-
morphism. Let U be the unitary operator for the polar decomposition of
√
ρB0
√
ρB1 [31],
√
ρB0
√
ρB1 =
∣∣∣∣
√
ρB0
√
ρB1
∣∣∣∣U. (31)
Then |〈Φ0|Φ1〉|2 assumes its maximum value F (ρB0 , ρB1 ) when
UUT2 U0U
T
0 U
T
1 = I (32)
where T denotes the transpose operation. Thus, when ρB0 , ρ
B
1 , and |ei〉 are given, |gi〉 = |e′i〉
of |Φ1〉 is determined from (30) via solving for U from (32), which required detailed explicit
knowledge of ρB0 and ρ
B
1 . In terms of the notation for (13)-(14), the density operators are
ρBi =
1
2n−1
∑
j∈Λi
n⊗
l=1
Uljl|ψl〉〈ψl|U †ljl i ∈ {0, 1}, (33)
which is unknown to Adam through the |ψl〉 uncertainty. If Adam picks a cheating trans-
formation for a particular |ψl〉 sequence, and then the |ψl〉 sequence is randomly varied, it
is easily seen that the resulting PAc can be very small, as e.g. when the corresponding odd-
parity state is actually of even parity. However, it is not easy to develop an unconditional
security proof because Adam has many other possible actions, including committing states
which are not exactly correct for the bit value as mentioned above. Nevertheless, the pro-
tocol clearly shows in a simple way that the impossibility proof fails to work as intended.
Note that this anonymous-key strategy also works in the case ρB0 = ρ
B
1 if ρ
B
0 is not highly
degenerate, e.g., not proportional to the identity IB, such that its eigenstates cannot be
readily determined as in the case of (33). Indeed, for n = ∞ the ρB0 and ρB1 from (33) are
equal and not proportional to IB. Note that the strategy of this protocol, namely the use of
anonymous states, is applicable to any QBC protocol, and will be employed next for protocol
QBC2.
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VI Protocol QBC2
In this section, protocol QBC2 is developed with a complete unconditional security proof by
exploting the following point: the states ρB0 and ρ
B
1 that enter into (7) are not necessarily
the marginal states obtained from (1)-(2) due to Babe’s lack of information built into a QBC
protocol. This situation is actually easy to obtain, but then Adam can usually cheat success-
fully with this information. The anonymous-key technique can be utilized to prevent both
Adam and Babe from cheating to yield an unconditionally secure protocol to be explained
in successive steps as follows.
In anonymous-key encryption [12], Babe transmits to Adam a state |ψ〉 only known to
herself. Adam sends a bit b back to Babe via modulating |ψ〉 by openly known unitary
operators Ub. For the present purpose, the following would suffice – |ψ〉 ∈ S0 is one of the
four possible BB84 states of a qubit, S0 = {| ↑〉, | →〉, | ր〉, | ց〉}, (e.g. the vertically,
horitzontally, and diagonally polarized states). Adam sends back Ub|ψ〉 with U0 = IB and
U1 being a clockwise rotation by π/2 on the polarization circle, so that Babe can always tell
the bit from the state. Let her send Adam a set S of the above four different states on four
qubits in a random order known only to herself, with each state named by its order. Thus,
S = {|λ1〉1, |λ2〉2, |λ3〉3, |λ4〉4} where the subscript j on | 〉j denotes the name of the state
and {λj} is a random permutation of the set S0 = {↑,→,ր,ց}. Adam picks randomly one
of these four named states in S, keeping the name to himself, modulates it and sends it to
Babe as the commitment. For example, he chooses |λ2〉2 with subscript 2 on | 〉2 known to
him, rotates λ2 unknown to him clockwise by π/2 for b = 1, and sends it back to Babe who
does not know the state name ”2” yet. He opens by revealing the state name and the bit
value. Without knowing the state name, it is easy to check that ρB0 = ρ
B
1 = I
B/2 for Babe.
When she learns the state name from Adam’s opening, she knows the corresponding state
for each bit value and can verify by measuring the corresponding projection. The actual
permutation of the S0-states in S has to be hidden from Adam because if he knows, he can
cheat by committing any state in S and announcing it to be another appropriate state from
S.
Consider first Adam’s possibility of cheating. When he picks a specific named state |λj〉j,
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he cannot apply the EPR cheat as a consequence of local state invariance or the fact that
there is no entanglement for a singla state. He can announce a different name of the state
from the one he actually sent, with a probability of successfully reversing b (i.e. getting
it accepted by Babe in her verification) given by 3/4.. He can use his own state instead
of the one sent by Babe; the best way to do that is by trying to determine which name
corresponds to which state in S by optimally processing the set S from M-ary quantum
detection theory (cf. Appendix A). In each case he attains a probability of success bounded
away from zero. Let pA be his maximum probability of success, which is determined by the
optimal M-ary quantum detector because his openings amount to a decision making that
consists in matching each λj with an element of S0. The exact value of pA is not relevant
for the security proof of our final protocol. The only relevant point here is that pA is a fixed
number less than one. Hence, in an independent m-sequence, his probability of successful
cheating, P¯Ac = p
m
A , goes to zero exponentially in m.
To show that pA < 1, assume that Adam can cheat perfectly with pA = 1. This im-
plies that he can determine λj for each |λj〉j from the set S with certainty without knowing
the random permutation. However, the different possible permutations yield nonorthogonal
(mixed) states on the different qubit sets. By Theorem A2 in Appendix A, pA = 1 is impos-
sible. Indeed, the optimum pA is a fixed number bounded away from zero, not arbitrarily
small in a parameter n that grows with the number of such randomly permuted four-state
sets.
It is possible for Adam to consider EPR cheats by permuting the contents of the states to
be used later with a single qubit while keeping track of the state name. In this way, he can
form the entanglement (1)-(2), but he cannot transform one into the other without knowing
the specific permutation of the λj in the set S presented to him. And, of course, if he knows
the permutation, he can cheat by proper announcement without the need for entanglement.
Note also that if he can entangle and transform without knowing the actual permutation,
local state invariance would be violated by permuting the states back to the given order.
Indeed, this and all other possible attacks by Adam are accounted for in the above argument
that pA < 1 holds in any of Adam’s possible cheating schemes as a consequence of optimum
quantum detection theory.
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The only way that Babe can cheat is to send Adam a different set S ′ of states, e.g.
the same polarization state on the polarization circle for all four qubits, which would yield
P¯Bc = 1. This is to be prevented statistically via testing by having Babe send Adam a total
number of n sets of S-states, all named by their order. Consider first the case in which
Adam only commits a single qubit, and Babe sends a total of 4n states |λjl〉, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
l ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. If Babe is honest, then, for each j, {|λjl〉} is a random permutation of S0. To
prevent Babe from cheating, Adam would randomly set aside one set j0 and ask Babe for the
state identities in the other n−1 sets. After Babe reveals the state identities from their names
provided by Adam, he can verify that Babe indeed sent him sets of proper states and proceed
to pick one from the j0 set to commit his bit. If Babe sends a set S
′ = {|1〉, |2〉, |3〉, |4〉},
which is not a random permutation of S0, then there is a probability p1 that it will pass
Adam’s testing verification,
p1 = |〈1| ↑〉|2 · |〈2| →〉|2 · |〈3| ր〉|2 · |〈4| ց〉|2, (34)
and a corresponding optimum probability p2 that Babe can determine the bit knowing the
qubit is from S ′. The value of p2 is determined by the optimum binary quantum detector.
For example, if Babe sends all states at the angle π/8 from ↑, p1 = cos2 π8 cos2 π8 cos2 3π8 sin2 π8
and p2 = 1. As far as the existence of an unconditionally secure protocol is concerned, the
only thing we need to know is that p1 = 1 implies p2 =
1
2
from (34). It is clear that any
entanglement used by Babe on the state she sent would not help her cheat, because Adam is
doing everything on the individual qubit level determined by the individual marginal qubit
states. Indeed, Babe’s entanglement would only make p2 smaller. For Babe to get P¯
B
c away
from 1
2
, she needs to send state sets with p2 =
1
2
+ ǫ where ǫ is bounded away from zero, i.e.
not arbitrarily small as a function of n, and send enough of them so that the chance that one
of them is picked as j0 by Adam is also not arbitrarily small for large n. In such a situation
where Adam retains one of Babe’s cheating state sets which constitute a nonzero fraction
γ of the total number n, the probability that Babe’s cheating would not be found out is
pγn−11 , assuming Adam indeed sets aside one of the cheating state sets, which goes to zero
exponentially. This argument is essentially correct and will be presented rigorously in the
more general situation of the protocol in the following. Here we tried to indicate the simple
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intuitive picture of the situation, and the fact that our scheme so far already contradicts
the (IP) statement, although it falls short of the (US) statement. It should be evident that
regardless of whether (US) can be obtained in this kind of schemes, the are not covered by
the formulation of the impossibility proof.
Were Babe found to be cheating, the protocol would of course abort, which is equivalent to
one party aborting in the middle of any protocol, something each party can always choose to
do. Thus, our scheme is no different in this respect from any other cryptographic protocol and
is essentially different from the cheat-sensitive QBC protocols [10] in that it has nothing to
do with detecting possible cheating by Adam and Babe after Adam commits as prescribed in
the definition of cheat-sensitive protocols. Indeed, Adam can discover the cheating before he
commits the bit. Even though he could postpone the cheating detection measurement in our
protocol, such a move would have betrayed his bit to Babe, cf. point (4) in Section IV. More
significantly, the cheating probabilities were not quantified precisely in Ref. [10] – presumably
if the successful cheating probability is bounded away from zero, then so is the cheat-detection
probability. In the present case, arbitrarily small successful cheating probabilities can be
obtained in the next protocol, the parameters n,m of which are determined as shown in the
following security proof.
PROTOCOL QBC2:
(i) Babe sends Adam n sets of qubit states, each set a random permutation of the four
BB84 states on four different qubits, in a random order only known to herself. The states
are named by their order in the sequence.
(ii) Adam randomly puts m sets of such states aside and asks Babe to identify the rest
of the states from their names. After checking that the states are correct, he commits the
bit by picking one state randomly out of each of the m sets, modulates them by the same
Ub, and sends them to Babe.
(iii) Adam opens by revealing the names of the states he sent and the bit value. Babe
verifies by measuring the corresponding projections.
It should be clear that no entanglement cheating would be effective in this protocol: as
discussed above, entanglement cheating by Adam or Babe serves no purpose as the qubits are
processed individually. For each bit value Adam commits, there is only one product marginal
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state for Babe and thus no cheating transformation for Adam. If Adam entangles anyway, he
would merely send back mixed marginal states to Babe as she verifies on individual qubits.
If he does not commit a correct state as discussed after (23) in Section V, it merely changes
pA, the optimum value of which is not 1 as shown above. If Babe entangles anyway, she
would just get back mixed states for herself. Consequence of such a situation, however, is
also covered in the following. Similarly, introducing any classical correlation would serve no
purpose. The protocol is binding because Adam’s P¯Ac = p
m
A → 0 for large m. It is concealing
basically for the same reason as the single-qubit case, a systematic proof given as follows.
Let N be the number of state sets Babe sends to Adam with probabilities p1 of passing
Adam’s detection, p1 < 1 with corresponding p2 >
1
2
. Consider first the case in which these
probabilities are uniform among the N sets so that Babe can have the best possible p2 given
p1 among the m different committed qubits. The other n−N sets have p1 = 1 and p2 = 12 .
The probability that k of these N sets fall into the m choices by Adam is given by the
hypergeometric distribution,
Pk(N, n,m) =
(
N
k
)(
n−N
m− k
)
(
n
m
) . (35)
The probability that none of these N sets fall into the chosen m group is P0(N, n,m), a
decreasing function of N and an increasing function of n. Let m be the smallest integer that
yields P¯Ac = p
m
A ≤ ǫ for given ǫ > 0. The idea is that N must be large enough that at least
one of the N sets needs to fall into the m group to get P¯Bc >
1
2
, but then by making n large,
N would have to be so large that the probability Pu that Babe’s cheating sets are undetected
becomes too small. Recall that P¯Bc is the optimal probability Babe succeeds in identifying
the bit from measurements on m committed qubits. It will be shown that the condition
P¯Bc ≥
1
2
+ ǫ (36)
would imply Pu ≤ ǫ by proper choice of n, thus ensuring unconditional security. Since Babe
must have at least one of the N sets picked up by Adam among his m sets in order to satisfy
(36),
P¯Bc ≤
1
2
P0 + (1− P0)P (p2, m) ≤ 1− P0
2
. (37)
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By equating the upper and lower bounds (36) and (37) on P¯Bc , N must satisfy
N ≥ f(ǫ, n,m(ǫ, pA)) (38)
where f is defined through P0(N, n,m) and is an increasing function of n. For any N, n,
P0(N, n,m) =
(
n−m
N
)
(
n
N
)
can be made arbitrarily small with n large. Thus, N can be forced to be arbitrarily small
from (38) with n sufficiently large. If there is an a priori maximum p¯1 among the qubits
in the N sets, which is proved in the following, one would have Pu ≤ p¯N−m1 . So n can be
chosen to make N large enough from (38) to yield p¯N−m1 = ǫ. As a consequence, P¯
A
c ≤ ǫ and
P¯Bc ≤ ǫ, proving (US).
To put an a priori limit on p1 independent of n and less than one, consider first the
case where all qubits in the N sets have the same underlying S ′ so that Babe knows what
measurement to make on each. Let P (S ′, m) be the optimum probability that Babe succeeds
in identifying b from measurements on the m qubit sets. Thus, P (S ′, m) is a continuous
function of the S ′ that gives rise to the p2 as it is a trace norm of the states from (A4). (All
norm topologies are equivalent in finite-dimensional spaces). In order for (36) to be satisfied,
one must have
P (S ′, m) ≥ 1
2
+ ǫ (39)
for some ǫ > 0. The maximum p1 that Babe can have is determined among all the qubit
sets S ′ that satisfy (39) and 1 ≥ P (S ′, m). The maximum p¯1 = maxS′′ p1(S ′′) exists for
the following reason. Thus the set of S ′ obeying (39) and P (S ′, m) ≤ 1 is closed and thus
compact. The function p1(S
′) of (34) is continuous. The existence of p¯1 thus follows from
the Weierstrass theorem. That is, a maximum p¯1 is achieved by some S
′
0 in the constraint
set and so p¯1 < 1. Now suppose Babe has formed entanglements among the sets she sends
to Adam. The N sets are defined according to whether each marginal state, as checked and
modulated by Adam, would have pj1 = 1, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, instead of P (S ′, m) one has
P (S′, m) that includes optimization over all possible entangled states S′, which provides an
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upper bound to P¯Bc and is still given through the trace norm (A4). Let p¯1 = maxSj p1(S
′
j)
for all marginal S ′j obtained from S
′ that satisfy 1 ≥ P (S′, m) ≥ 1
2
+ ǫ. All S ′j in the N -set
lead to pj2 <
1
2
by definition of the N -set. Thus, the existence of p¯1 < 1 follows as in the
uniform S ′j case. We have now exhausted all possible actions by Adam and Babe.
In order to execute this protocol in accordance with the above proof in choosing m and
n, one needs to know pA and p¯1. These appear to be difficult to obtain analytically, and
numerical solutions would need to be used in an actual implementation. In such a situation,
the above technicality on the existence of p¯1 < 1 would not occur. While it is easily shown
that no four large-energy coherent states can approximate the behavior of the four BB84
states in S0, it may still be possible to develop large-energy coherent-state implementation
of this protocol because not all properties of the BB84 states are needed.
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VII Protocol QBC3
The points (7)-(8) in Section IV are now exploited to create a protocol that defeats Adam’s
EPR cheat. Consider the following addition to protocol QBC0 in Section II: after Adam
commits, Babe picks randomly N out of the n qubits and measures randomly on each either
|φ〉〈φ| or |φ′〉〈φ′|, but does not tell Adam which qubits she picked and what measurement
results she obtained. When Adam opens, she would verify among the N qubits those that
match Adam’s announcement and the rest n − N qubits, and take those that don’t match
Adam’s announcement as correct. Thus, she does not have a perfect verification, but Adam
cannot cheat successfully by changing one bit position in his announcement when N/n is
small. On the other hand, this action by Babe effectively destroys the entanglement that
Adam may have formed for the EPR cheat, as shown below. Babe needs to keep secret which
N qubits she made measurements upon, or else Adam can alter his basis |ei〉 to entangle
properly to the other n−N qubits. Condition on the parameters will be given.
PROTOCOL QBC3
(i) Adam sends Babe a sequence of n qubits, each in either one of {|φ〉, |φ′〉}, and commits
b via the parity of the sequence with uniform probability.
(ii) Babe randomly picks N out of n qubits, randomly measures either |φ〉〈φ| or |φ′〉〈φ′|
on each, and keeps the results secret from Adam.
(iii) After Adam reveals the sequence commitment, Babe verifies those states that match
among the N measured qubits and the n−N unmeasured ones.
The protocol can be made concealing as in QBC0 and QBC1, but Adam can now cheat
in more ways. Similar to QBC1, he can pick one qubit and announce it otherwise, which
now has a higher probability of success because of Babe’s measurements. From the union
bound on the probability of two possible events,
PAc ≤ |〈φ|φ′〉|2 +
N
n
. (40)
Thus one may pick
|〈φ|φ′〉|2 = O(m−1) (41)
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similar to (23) and also
N/n = O(m−1), (42)
so that PAc = O(m
−1). Adam can, in view of Babe’s possible measurements, entangle as
small a number of qubits as possible. If he wants an entanglement cheating probability of
P¯Ac = 1−O(m−1), (43)
he would need to entangle n′ = O(m logm), so that the resulting P¯Bc =
1
2
+ O(m−1) would
guarantee (43) through (12). Thus, to maintain just this order of P¯Bc , n should be reduced
to n = O(m logm) compared to QBC1, and so N = O(logm) from (43).
If Adam just cheats as if Babe has made no measurement, a direct computation shows
that, for pi = p
′
i = 1/M ,
|〈Φ′′0|Φ1〉|2 = 2−N (44)
where |Φ′′0〉 is the cheating entangled state from |Φ0〉 after Babe made her N qubit measure-
ments as follows. The state |Φ′′0〉 can be written, from (5),
|Φ′′0〉 =
√
N
M
∑
j
∑
iN+1...in−1
ViN iN+1...in−1j |e′j〉|φiN iN+1...in−1〉 (45)
where iN are the fixed indices corresponding to Babe’s measurements results and N is a
normalization constant determined to be N = 2N . Then (44) follows from (45) and the
unitarity of Vij . However, this does not yet constitute an unconditional security proof for
the following reasons. Adam does not have to apply the cheating transformation as if Babe
has made no measurements. It remains to be demonstrated that his optimal cheating trans-
formation, particularly in the case he does not generate an exactly correct initial state for
the bit value as discussed after Eq. (23), would lead to an arbitrarily small PAc . Furthermore,
Adam may aim lower than P¯Ac = 1−O(m−1) by optimizing differently, just to defeat (US).
I believe QBC3 is in fact unconditionally secure, as I believe QBC1 is, and a new for-
mulation of the QBC problem is being developed to facilitate further analysis of the PAc
behavior in QBC protocols with possible entanglement attacks. Such general treatment is
important because the strategy of this protocol is applicable to all QBC protocols in which
the bit value is obtained from a correlated function of the individual bit positions, and the
strategy of QBC1, namely the use of anonymous states, is applicable to any QBC protocol.
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VIII Conclusion
I hope this paper leaves no doubt that not only is there no general impossibility proof for
unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment, but that, in fact, an unconditionally secure
QBC protocol has actually been provided. The intuitive reasons and a complete proof that
QBC2 satisfies (US) have been described in Section VI. The protocols QBC1 and QBC3,
while not proved to be unconditionally secure in this paper, already demonstrate the failure
of the impossibility proof given in the literature. Additional gaps of the impossibility proof
are indicated in Section IV and can be exploited for further secure QBC schemes.
Some comments on the practicality of our protocols are in order. Protocols QBC0,
QBC1, and QBC3 can be readily implemented with large-energy coherent states. However,
there is a sensitivity problem that results from |〈φ|φ′〉| ∼ 0, which obscures the difference
in practice between the two cases of detection for verification versus cheating corresponding
to the cases when the state is known or unknown. An investigation into sensitive detection
schemes would be timely. Also, it is expected that this and other practical difficulties can
be alleviated by the use of error-correcting codes or hash functions more complicated than
parity. Perhaps a large-energy coherent-state scheme similar to QBC2 can also be developed.
Another promising avenue is the utilization of the irreducible quantum noise in quantum
signal detection schemes to achieve unconditionally secure bit commitment. The loss in
fiber-optic communications, especially for the established Internet backbone, can also be
used to generate irreducible quantum noise. The resulting protocols, together with similarly
possible quantum key distribution and encryption schemes, may open the exciting possibility
of optical-speed unconditionally secure cryptography for widespread applications.
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Appendix A
Quantum Detection Theory
Quantum detection theory [13], [28] is concerned with the determination of the optimum
quantum measurement and the resulting optimum performance for discriminating a finite
number M of alternative hypotheses according to a given performance criterion linear in
the density operators ρj , j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, describing the quantum states of the different
alternatives. It has not been used in the previous quantum cryptography literature other
than my papers [12], [19], [32], [33], although it actually has a crucial role, especially in QBC.
Thus, Babe’s optimum probability of cheating is given by the optimum binary quantum
detector for ρB0 and ρ
B
1 .
In binary quantum hypothesis testing with a priori probabilities p0 and p1 = 1 − p0,
the decision is made on the basis of measuring a POM (positive operator-valued measure)
described by Π0 and Π1 = I −Π0, Π0 ≥ 0 (an operator inequality A ≥ B means that A−B
is positive semidefinite). The hypothesis i is chosen correctly from the measurement result
with probability trΠiρi, so that the total probability of correct decison is given by
PC2 = p0trΠ0ρ0 + p1trΠ1ρ1. (A1)
In M-ary hypothesis testing, (A1) generalizes to
PCM =
M∑
i=1
pitrΠiρi (A2)
where the {Πi} form the M-outcome POM
M∑
i=1
Πi = I, Πi ≥ 0. (A3)
An operator τ is called trace-class if its trace norm ‖τ‖1 ≡ tr
√
τ †τ is defined (finite); thus
all operators on finite-dimensional spaces are trace-class. Density operators are trace-class.
The optimum P¯C2 among all POM’s can be written as follows.
Lemma A1:
P¯C2 =
1
2
+
1
2
‖p0ρ0 − p1ρ1‖1. (A4)
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Proof: Write p0ρ0 − p1ρ1 = σ+ − σ−, the positive and negative eigenvalue parts, so that
|p0ρ0 − p1ρ1| ≡
√
(p0ρ0 − p1ρ1)2 = σ+ + σ−. From tr(p0ρ0 − p1ρ1) = p0 − p1, one has
trσ+ = trσ− + p0 − p1. Now, from (A1),
P¯C2 = p1 + max
0≤Π≤I
trΠ(p0ρ0 − p1ρ1),
while
max
0≤Π≤I
trΠ(p0ρ0 − p1ρ1) = max
0≤Π≤I,Πσ−=0
trΠσ+ = trσ+ =
1
2
‖p0ρ0 − p1ρ1‖1 + 1
2
(p0 − p1),
and (A4) follows. ✷
For two pure states, |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉, (A4) reduces to
PC2 =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− 4p0p1|〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2. (A5)
The use of “information” e.g. as in Ref. [34], is not sufficient in QBC because it is not the
relevant performance measure, and the optimum detectors for P¯Bc and mutual information
are usually not the same. Indeed, generally in cryptography, the use of mutual information
is often not sufficiently precise because it has only asymptotic significance in a noisy system,
and at least Eve has no possibility of coding. Thus, the performance resulting from attacks by
Eve or by cheating among users in QBC should be measured by their respective probabilities
of success. In some cases, including many quantum key-distribution situations, the mutual
information could be used to bound the successful eavesdropping probability. But even in
those situations the resulting system design may be overly pessimistic when the mutual
information criterion is employed.
An important condition whose validity seems clear intuitively is that P¯C2 = 1 in binary
quantum detection if and only if the states satisfy ρ0ρ1 = 0, i.e. the ranges of ρ0 and ρ1 are
orthogonal subspaces of the state Hilbert space. The “if” part is immediate and the “only if”
part, which follows from (A5) when ρ0 and ρ1 are pure states, seems to be a consequence of the
general no-clone theorem. Specifically, one would be able to clone two nonorthogonal states
if one could discriminate between them perfectly. However, the unitarity argument used for
no-cloning is not sufficient to include measurement transformations – at least many physicists
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believe that a quantum measurement transformation with a specific reading is not describable
by a unitary transformation on any larger Hilbert space. Nor is linearity sufficient. Thus, the
impossibility of perfectly discriminating nonorthogonal pure states, expressed as ρ0ρ1 6= 0
for general mixed states, is a separate property to be demonstrated, indeed even just for
completing the no-clone argument. That such a property can be demonstrated from quantum
detection theory, as done below, appears to me to be another manifestation of the “magical
unity” or consistency of the quantum formalism.
The proof of the following theorem generalizes a finite-dimensional proof for the case
λ0 = λ1 = 1 first communicated to the author by Masanao Ozawa.
Theorem A1: For positive constants λ0, λ1 and density operators ρ0, ρ1, the maximum value
of ‖λ0ρ0 − λ1ρ1‖1 amoung all possible ρ0, ρ1 occurs only when ρ0ρ1 = 0, with
‖λ0ρ0 − λ1ρ1‖1 = λ0 + λ1. (A6)
Proof: In the finite-dimensional case, the polar decomposition of
ρ′ ≡ λ0ρ0 − λ1ρ1 = U |λ0ρ0 − λ1ρ1| (A7)
always exists for a unitary U . In the infinite-dimensional case, U is only a partial isometry in
general [35]. Since ρ′ on H has an eigenvector decomposition as it is trace-class, U becomes
an isometry when restricted to the space Hr ⊂ H, the range of ρ′. Thus, U †U = IHr , and
we can write
|λ0ρ0 − λ1ρ1| = V (λ0ρ0 − λ1ρ1) (A8)
where V = U †, ‖V ‖ = 1. From (A8),
‖ρ′‖1 = trV (λ0ρ0 − λ1ρ1) = trV λ0ρ0 − trV λ1ρ1. (A9)
Now, from (18), for any trace-class operator A ≥ 0 and any V with ‖V ‖ = 1, the real part
Re tr(V A) ≤ |tr(V A)| ≤ ‖V A‖1 ≤ ‖V ‖‖A‖1 = Re trA,
leading to
Re tr(V A) ≤ Re trA (A10)
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from which it follows that
− λ0 ≤ Re trV λ0ρ0 ≤ λ0, −λ1 ≤ −trUλ1ρ1 ≤ λ1. (A11)
From (A9) and (A11), we have
max
ρ0,ρ1
‖ρ′‖1 = λ0 + λ1 (A12)
which occurs when
Re trV ρ0 = 1 and Re trV ρ1 = −1. (A13)
Let ρ0 have the spectral decomposition ρ0 =
∑
n νn|φn〉〈φn|. Then (A13) implies
∑
n
νn〈φn|V |φn〉 = 1.
Since 0 ≤ νn ≤ 1 and∑n νn = 1, if νn 6= 0 we have Re〈φn|V |φn〉 = 1 and hence V |φn〉 = |φn〉.
Let ρ1 have the spectral decomposition ρ1 =
∑
m µm|ψm〉〈ψm|. Similarly, if µm 6= 0, then
V |ψm〉 = −|ψm〉. Since V V † = IHr , the eigenvectors of V with different eigenvalues are
mutually orthogonal and hence
ρ0ρ1 =
∑
m,n
νnµm|φn〉〈φn|ψm〉〈ψm| = 0. (A14)
✷
Corollary A1: PC2 = 1 if and only if ρ0ρ1 = 0.
I would like to emphasize that by itself, without the need for unitarity, Corollary A1
already implies the no-clone theorem for arbitrary ρ0ρ1 6= 0. This is because if one can
clone, one can obtain an indefinitely large number of copies of the state, which would make
it possible to determine the state arbitrarily accurately and hence contradicting the corol-
lary. On the other hand, an argument using the physical interpretation of density operator
as an ensemble would show, in conjunction with the pure-state result from (A5), that the
eigenstates of ρ0 and ρ1 must be mutually orthogonal to ensure P¯C2 = 0, thus proving the
corollary without Theorem A1. While this can be considered a new kind of mathematics,
proving mathematical theorems from physical arguments, it is appropriate to separate phys-
ical interpretation from what the mathematical formalism says by itself, if only to check
whether they are compatible.
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The above theorem can be generalized to M-ary hypothesis testing.
Theorem A2: PCM = 1 if and only if ρiρj = 0 for all i 6= j.
Proof: If one pair is not orthogonal, say ρ1ρ2 6= 0, then
PCM = p1trΠ1ρ1 + p2trΠ2ρ2 +
M∑
i=3
pitrΠiρi ≤ p1trΠρ1 + p2trΠ2ρ2 + 1− p1 − p2
since (A3) implies ‖Πi‖ ≤ 1 so that trΠiρi ≤ 1 from (18) and (A3). Because the maximum
over Π0 of the expression (A1) is given by (A4) for any positive p0, p1, as can be seen from
the proof of Lemma A1, it follows from Theorem A1 that p1trΠ1ρ1 + p2trΠ2ρ2 = 1 if and
only if ρ1ρ2 = 0. Thus PCM < 1. The contraposition of this conclusion is the nontrivial part
of the theorem. ✷
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Appendix B
Local State Invariance
The local state invariance theorem is conceptually significant and has a simple proof.
Theorem (Local State Invariance): Let ρAB be a state on HA ⊗ HB with marginal states
ρA ≡ trBρAB, ρB. The individual or combined effects of any state transformation and quan-
tum measurement (averaged over the measurement results) on HA alone leaves ρB invariant.
Proof: It suffices to consider a pure state |Φ〉 ∈ HA⊗HB in Schmidt form |Φ〉 = ∑k αk|ek〉|φk〉,
〈ek|ek′〉 = 〈φk|φk′〉 = δkk′ so that ρB = ∑k |αk|2|φk〉〈φk|. The most general operation on HA
can be represented by extending HA to HA ⊗HA′ with initial state |A′〉 ∈ HA′ , and apply-
ing a unitary U and measuring a complete orthonormal basis {|n〉〈n|} on HA ⊗ HA′ [36].
This results in ρ˜B =
∑
n |n〉〈n|U |Φ〉|A′〉〈A′|〈Φ|U †|n〉〈n| so that 〈φk|ρ˜B|φk′〉 = |αk|2δkk′ =
〈φk|ρB|φk′〉. The same result obtains when either U or the measurement on {|n〉〈n|} is omit-
ted. ✷
The Schmidt decomposition in the above proof only simplifies notation and is not essential.
This theorem implies that superluminal communication via quantum entanglement is impos-
sible, which would be obtained if and only if ρB is changed so that a binary communication
channel of classical information with nonzero channel capacity is created. Observe that the
averaging over measurement results in the theorem is a crucial condition for application to
superluminal communication in which the specific measurement result on HA is unknown
to the party with HB. While there are many proofs on the impossibility of entanglement
induced superluminal communication in the literature, see, e.g., [37], none appears to be as
complete and simple as the proof just given. In particular, the impossibility of cloning quan-
tum states in some such proofs is not sufficient to establish the impossibility of superluminal
communication.
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Appendix C
Even and Odd Binomial Sums
The even and odd binomial sums used in obtaining (15) are derived as follows. Let Pm be
the odd sum
Pm ≡
m∑
r odd
(
m
r
)
pr(1− p)m−r (C1)
where p ≤ 1
2
, and let Qm be the even sum, Qm = 1− Pm. Using the identity
(
m+ 1
r
)
=
(
m
r
)
+
(
m
r − 1
)
,
the following difference equation for Pm can be derived from (C1):
Pm+1 − Pm = p(Qm − Pm) = p(1− 2Pm). (C2)
Eq. (C2) with the initial condition P1 = p is solved to yield
Pm =
1
2
− 1
2
(1− 2p)m. (C3)
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